<!-- Aegis skill network-security v1.1.0 (osk 1.1). Generated file: edit the source skill, not this. -->

> Intel as of 2026-08-22.

# Network Security Skill

## Scope and authorization

- Purpose: Review segmentation, traffic, firewall rules and hardening to shrink your network attack surface.
- Use only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to assess.
- Out of scope: scanning, intercepting or disrupting networks you are not authorised to assess, and denial-of-service testing.
- No network or API calls by the assistant: it never makes network requests, calls APIs or contacts outside services. Commands here are for a human operator to review and run. Redact secrets, credentials, personal data and samples before sharing anything.


Assess and harden the network attack surface. Use this skill to enumerate network assets,
review segmentation controls, analyse traffic patterns for anomalies, and produce a
prioritised hardening checklist anchored to ATT&CK lateral movement and discovery techniques.

## Phase Map

```
Phase 1 → Network Inventory        [read: references/network-inventory.md]
Phase 2 → Segmentation Review      [read: references/segmentation-review.md]
Phase 3 → Traffic Analysis         [read: references/traffic-analysis.md]
Phase 4 → Hardening Checklist      [read: references/hardening-checklist.md]
```

## Output Format

Produce a prioritised hardening checklist table with ATT&CK technique mitigated, implementation complexity, and owner.

## Phases

Load each phase only when the workflow reaches it:

- [Network inventory](references/network-inventory.md)
- [Segmentation review](references/segmentation-review.md)
- [Traffic analysis](references/traffic-analysis.md)
- [Hardening checklist](references/hardening-checklist.md)
- [Cve patch management](references/cve-patch-management.md)
- [Live threat intel](references/live-threat-intel.md) — auto-updated weekly

---

## Phase: network-inventory

# Network Inventory — Reference

Use during Phase 1 to enumerate all network assets before segmentation review or hardening work.

## Discovery Methods

| Method | Tool | Use Case | ATT&CK Relevance |
|--------|------|----------|------------------|
| Active scan | nmap `-sn -PE` | Ping sweep for live hosts | T1046 Network Service Discovery |
| Port scan | nmap `-sV -sC -p-` | Service/version enumeration | T1046 |
| Passive ARP | arp-scan, Wireshark | Layer-2 host discovery without noise | T1040 Network Sniffing |
| Cloud inventory | AWS CLI `ec2 describe-instances`, Azure `az vm list` | Cloud asset enumeration | T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery |
| AD query | `Get-ADComputer -Filter *` | Active Directory computer objects | T1018 Remote System Discovery |
| DNS zone transfer | `dig axfr @nameserver domain` | Enumerate DNS records | T1590 Gather Victim Network Info |
| CMDB export | ServiceNow / Lansweeper API | Authoritative asset list baseline | — |

## Active Discovery — Nmap Commands

```bash
# Ping sweep — discover live hosts
nmap -sn 10.0.0.0/8 -oG live-hosts.gnmap

# Service and version scan on discovered hosts
nmap -sV -sC -O -T4 -iL live-hosts.txt -oX services.xml

# UDP top ports (slow — restrict to critical subnets)
nmap -sU --top-ports 20 10.0.1.0/24
```

## Cloud Asset Discovery

```bash
# AWS — list EC2 instances with tags
aws ec2 describe-instances --query \
  "Reservations[*].Instances[*].{IP:PrivateIpAddress,Name:Tags[?Key=='Name']|[0].Value,State:State.Name}"

# Azure — list all VMs
az vm list --show-details --query "[*].{Name:name,IP:privateIps,State:powerState}"
```

## Asset Inventory Output Table

| IP Address | Hostname | OS | Open Ports | Role | Business Owner | Criticality |
|------------|----------|----|------------|------|----------------|-------------|
| 10.0.1.10 | dc01.corp | Windows Server 2022 | 53,88,389,445 | Domain Controller | IT Ops | Critical |
| 10.0.2.50 | web-prod-01 | Ubuntu 22.04 | 80,443 | Web Server | App Team | High |

## IP Range Classification

Segment all discovered ranges into:
1. **Crown jewel subnets** — contain Tier 1 assets (DCs, PAM, HSMs)
2. **Production subnets** — servers, databases
3. **User subnets** — workstations, BYOD
4. **DMZ/perimeter** — internet-facing services
5. **OT/ICS subnets** — operational technology (if applicable)
6. **Cloud VPCs** — per environment (prod/dev/staging)

---

## Phase: segmentation-review

# Segmentation Review — Reference

Use during Phase 2 to assess whether network segments correctly enforce least-privilege access between zones.

## Segmentation Principles

Effective segmentation limits lateral movement (T1021) and discovery (T1046, T1018) by requiring explicit trust between zones. Every segment crossing should be policy-controlled and logged.

## VLAN and Zone Review Checklist

| Control | Expected State | Assessment Method | ATT&CK Technique Mitigated |
|---------|---------------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Inter-VLAN routing restricted | Only required ports between VLANs | Firewall rule review + test traffic | T1021 Remote Services |
| IT/OT boundary firewall | Unidirectional or tightly filtered | Firewall rule export review | T1021, T1566 |
| DMZ → Internal blocked | DMZ cannot initiate sessions to internal | ACL review, penetration test | T1190, T1133 |
| User subnet → Server subnet | Only approved application ports | Policy review + flow data | T1021.002 SMB, T1021.006 WinRM |
| Jump host / PAM enforced | All admin access routes via privileged access workstation | Firewall log review | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Crown jewel isolation | Domain controllers, HSMs, backup servers in dedicated segment | Network diagram validation | T1003, T1490 |

## Cloud VPC Segmentation Review

```
AWS checklist:
[ ] Security groups — no 0.0.0.0/0 inbound on SSH/RDP
[ ] NACLs applied at subnet level for defence-in-depth
[ ] VPC Flow Logs enabled in all VPCs
[ ] Transit Gateway attachments reviewed — no unexpected cross-account routes
[ ] PrivateLink used for AWS service access (no public endpoints)

Azure checklist:
[ ] NSG rules reviewed — deny-all default applied
[ ] Azure Firewall or NVA on hub-spoke boundary
[ ] No peering to untrusted subscriptions
[ ] Private Endpoints configured for PaaS services
```

## IT/OT Boundary Controls

For environments with operational technology:

| Boundary | Required Control | Acceptable Exception |
|----------|-----------------|----------------------|
| IT → OT | Industrial DMZ (IDMZ) with one-way data diode or firewall | Approved historian replication only |
| OT → Internet | Blocked at perimeter | Vendor remote access via jump host with MFA |
| Engineering workstations | Isolated VLAN, no internet | Software update via approved proxy |
| SCADA/HMI | Air-gapped or strict whitelist | — |

## Segmentation Gap Register Template

| Finding | Source Zone | Destination Zone | Port/Protocol | Risk | Recommended Action |
|---------|-------------|-----------------|---------------|------|--------------------|
| User VLAN can reach DC on all ports | Users (10.1.0.0/24) | DC (10.0.0.10) | All | High | Restrict to 88,389,445,3268 only |

---

## Phase: traffic-analysis

# Traffic Analysis — Reference

Use during Phase 3 to identify anomalous traffic patterns indicative of adversary activity.

## Telemetry Sources

| Source | What It Provides | Collection Method |
|--------|-----------------|-------------------|
| NetFlow / IPFIX | Volume, direction, port, duration metadata | Flow exporter on routers/switches |
| DNS logs | Domain resolution history | Recursive resolver query logging |
| Proxy logs | HTTP/S URL, user-agent, response codes | Squid / Zscaler / Bluecoat |
| Firewall logs | Allow/deny decisions, NAT translations | Syslog / SIEM ingestion |
| PCAP | Full packet capture for deep inspection | Tap / SPAN port, Zeek/Suricata |
| VPC Flow Logs | Cloud east-west and north-south flows | AWS VPC Flow Logs / Azure NSG Flow |

## Beaconing and C2 Pattern Detection

| Pattern | Description | ATT&CK ID | Detection Query (SPL) |
|---------|-------------|-----------|----------------------|
| Regular interval DNS | Same domain queried every N seconds | T1071.004 | `index=dns \| bucket span=1m _time \| stats count by src_ip,query \| where count > 50` |
| Long-duration connections | Persistent TCP connection to unusual dest | T1071.001 | `index=netflow duration > 3600 dest_port IN (80,443,8080)` |
| Low-and-slow exfiltration | Small consistent outbound data volumes | T1030 | `index=netflow \| stats sum(bytes_out) by dest_ip \| where sum > 1000000` |
| DGA domains | High-entropy domain names with short TTL | T1568.002 | Entropy scoring on DNS query field |
| ICMP tunnelling | Unusually large ICMP payloads | T1095 | `index=netflow proto=1 bytes > 100` |
| SMB lateral movement | Internal SMB spikes between workstations | T1021.002 | `index=netflow dest_port=445 src_zone=users dest_zone=users` |
| DNS over HTTPS (DoH) | Bypasses DNS inspection | T1071.004 | Block non-authorised DoH resolvers (1.1.1.1:443 / 8.8.8.8:443) |

## Baseline Anomaly Approach

1. **Establish baseline** — collect 14 days of flow data during normal operations
2. **Profile per-host behaviour** — typical dest IPs, ports, data volumes, connection duration
3. **Alert on deviation** — flag hosts exceeding 3 standard deviations from baseline
4. **Prioritise by asset tier** — anomalies from Tier 1 assets (DCs, PAM) escalate immediately

## DNS Analysis Commands

```bash
# Extract top queried external domains from DNS logs
zeek-cut query < dns.log | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head 50

# Find high-entropy domain names (potential DGA)
python3 dga_entropy.py --threshold 3.5 --input dns.log
```

---

## Phase: hardening-checklist

# Network Hardening Checklist — Reference

Use during Phase 4 to prioritise and implement network hardening controls. Tier 1 controls are mandatory; Tier 2 and Tier 3 are risk-based.

## Tier 1 — Critical Controls (Implement Immediately)

| Control | Implementation Notes | ATT&CK Technique Mitigated | Complexity |
|---------|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------|
| Disable SMBv1 | Group Policy: `Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Protocol $false` | T1021.002 | Low |
| Block LLMNR/mDNS | GPO: Computer Config → Admin Templates → DNS Client → Turn off multicast name resolution | T1557.001 LLMNR Poisoning | Low |
| Enforce NTLMv2 minimum | GPO: Security Options → LAN Manager authentication level → NTLMv2 only | T1557 | Low |
| Firewall default-deny | All network firewalls set to implicit deny-all; only approved rules permitted | T1021, T1046 | Medium |
| Disable Telnet/FTP | Remove from all network devices; replace with SSH/SFTP | T1021.004 | Low |
| Enable VPC Flow Logs | All cloud VPCs; retain 90+ days in SIEM | T1040 | Low |
| Patch network devices | Monthly patch cycle for routers, switches, firewalls; out-of-band management | T1190 | Medium |

## Tier 2 — High-Value Controls (Implement Within 30 Days)

| Control | Implementation Notes | ATT&CK Technique Mitigated | Complexity |
|---------|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------|
| Network Access Control (NAC) | 802.1X port authentication; quarantine VLAN for non-compliant devices | T1200 Hardware Additions | High |
| DNS RPZ (Response Policy Zones) | Block known-malicious domains at resolver; subscribe to threat intel feed | T1071.004 | Medium |
| East-west micro-segmentation | Zero-trust microsegmentation for crown jewel subnets (VMware NSX or equivalent) | T1021 | High |
| NetFlow export to SIEM | All perimeter and core switches/routers export flow data; baseline 14 days | T1040 | Medium |
| BGP route filtering | Implement prefix-list and AS-path filters on all BGP peers | T1599 Network Boundary Bridging | Medium |
| Disable unused switch ports | Access ports not in use set to unused VLAN and shutdown | T1200 | Low |

## Tier 3 — Defence-in-Depth Controls (Implement Within 90 Days)

| Control | Implementation Notes | ATT&CK Technique Mitigated | Complexity |
|---------|---------------------|---------------------------|-----------|
| Deception honeypots | Deploy network honeypots in user and server VLANs (e.g., Canarytokens, Thinkst Canary) | T1046, T1021 | Medium |
| Network DLP | Inspect and block sensitive data exfiltration over HTTP/S and DNS | T1048 Exfiltration | High |
| IPv6 security controls | Disable IPv6 where unused; filter RA messages; deploy IPv6 FW rules | T1049 | Medium |
| Out-of-band management network | Separate management VLAN/network for all infrastructure devices; no user access | T1557 | High |
| TLS inspection | Decrypt and inspect outbound TLS for malware/C2 detection | T1071.001 | High |
| DNSSEC validation | Enable DNSSEC validation on recursive resolvers | T1557.002 ARP Cache Poisoning | Medium |

## Compliance Mapping

| Control Tier | NIST CSF Function | CIS Control | PCI DSS Requirement |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| Tier 1 | Protect (PR.AC) | CIS 12, 13 | Req 1, 2 |
| Tier 2 | Protect + Detect (DE.CM) | CIS 12, 13, 14 | Req 1, 10 |
| Tier 3 | Detect + Respond (RS.AN) | CIS 14, 16 | Req 10, 11 |

---

## Phase: cve-patch-management

# Network Device CVE Patch Management — Reference

Use during Phase 5 to track CVE exposure across network infrastructure, prioritise
patching using CISA KEV, and validate remediation for Cisco, Fortinet, Juniper,
Palo Alto, VMware, Citrix, and other common network platforms.

## Network Device Vulnerability Scanning

```bash
# Nessus — scan network infrastructure with credential set
nessuscli scan new --name "Network Infra CVE Scan" \
  --policy "Network Devices Credentialed" --targets network-devices.txt

# OpenVAS / Greenbone scan (open source)
gvm-cli --gmp-username admin socket --socketpath /run/gvmd/gvmd.sock \
  --xml "<create_target><name>Network Devices</name><hosts>10.0.0.0/24</hosts></create_target>"

# Rapid7 InsightVM — automated patch prioritization for cisco, fortinet, juniper assets
nexpose-cli scan -t 10.0.0.0/24 --tag "network-infrastructure"

# Trivy — container/VM vulnerability scan (for vmware-hosted virtual network appliances)
trivy image --severity CRITICAL,HIGH fortinet/fortigate:latest

# Check Cisco IOS version against known CVE list
ssh admin@cisco-router 'show version' | grep -E 'Version|uptime'
```

## Critical CVE Reference by Vendor

### Cisco (IOS / IOS XE / NX-OS / ASA / FTD)
| CVE | Product | CVSS | CISA KEV | ATT&CK | Impact |
|-----|---------|------|----------|--------|--------|
| CVE-2023-20198 | Cisco IOS XE Web UI | 10.0 | Yes | T1190 | Unauthenticated RCE → admin account creation |
| CVE-2023-20273 | Cisco IOS XE | 7.2 | Yes | T1190 | Privilege escalation post-CVE-2023-20198 |
| CVE-2016-6366 | Cisco ASA SNMP | 8.5 | Yes | T1190 | Remote code execution via SNMP buffer overflow |
| CVE-2018-0101 | Cisco ASA VPN | 10.0 | Yes | T1133 | Double-free in SSL/TLS subsystem → RCE |

### Fortinet (FortiOS / FortiGate / FortiProxy)
| CVE | Product | CVSS | CISA KEV | ATT&CK | Impact |
|-----|---------|------|----------|--------|--------|
| CVE-2024-21762 | Fortinet FortiOS | 9.8 | Yes | T1133 | Out-of-bounds write → remote code execution |
| CVE-2023-27997 | FortiOS / FortiProxy SSL-VPN | 9.8 | Yes | T1133 | Heap buffer overflow → RCE pre-authentication |
| CVE-2022-40684 | FortiOS / FortiProxy / FortiSwitch | 9.8 | Yes | T1190 | Authentication bypass → admin operation via API |
| CVE-2018-13379 | Fortinet FortiGate SSL VPN | 9.8 | Yes | T1552 | Path traversal → credential file disclosure |

### Juniper Networks (Junos OS / Junos OS Evolved)
| CVE | Product | CVSS | CISA KEV | ATT&CK | Impact |
|-----|---------|------|----------|--------|--------|
| CVE-2023-36844 | Juniper Junos OS EX Series | 9.8 | Yes | T1190 | RCE via J-Web without authentication |
| CVE-2023-36845 | Juniper Junos OS / Evolved | 9.8 | Yes | T1190 | PHP environment variable manipulation → RCE |
| CVE-2024-21591 | Juniper Networks SRX / EX | 9.8 | No | T1190 | Out-of-bounds write in J-Web → DoS or RCE |

### Palo Alto Networks (PAN-OS)
| CVE | Product | CVSS | CISA KEV | ATT&CK | Impact |
|-----|---------|------|----------|--------|--------|
| CVE-2024-3400 | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 10.0 | Yes | T1190 | OS command injection via GlobalProtect Gateway |
| CVE-2021-3064 | PAN-OS GlobalProtect | 9.8 | Yes | T1190 | Buffer overflow → RCE without authentication |
| CVE-2020-2021 | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 10.0 | Yes | T1190 | Authentication bypass when SAML enabled |

### VMware (ESXi / vSphere / NSX)
| CVE | Product | CVSS | CISA KEV | ATT&CK | Impact |
|-----|---------|------|----------|--------|--------|
| CVE-2024-22252 | VMware ESXi / vSphere | 9.3 | Yes | T1210 | Use-after-free in XHCI USB controller → VM escape |
| CVE-2021-21985 | VMware vCenter | 9.8 | Yes | T1210 | RCE via vSAN plugin without authentication |
| CVE-2021-22005 | VMware vCenter | 9.8 | Yes | T1190 | Arbitrary file upload → code execution |

### Citrix (NetScaler ADC / Gateway)
| CVE | Product | CVSS | CISA KEV | ATT&CK | Impact |
|-----|---------|------|----------|--------|--------|
| CVE-2023-3519 | Citrix NetScaler ADC / Gateway | 9.8 | Yes | T1190 | Unauthenticated RCE in management interface |
| CVE-2023-4966 | Citrix NetScaler (Bleed) | 9.4 | Yes | T1552 | Sensitive information disclosure from memory |
| CVE-2019-19781 | Citrix ADC / Gateway | 9.8 | Yes | T1190 | Path traversal → code execution without auth |

### OpenSSL / TLS Libraries
| CVE | Library | CVSS | ATT&CK | Impact |
|-----|---------|------|--------|--------|
| CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed) | OpenSSL 1.0.1–1.0.1f | 7.5 | T1040 | Memory disclosure → private key theft |
| CVE-2022-0778 | OpenSSL 1.0.2 / 1.1.1 / 3.x | 7.5 | T1499 | Infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt → DoS |
| CVE-2023-0286 | OpenSSL 3.x | 7.4 | T1203 | Read/write beyond bounds via X.400 name |
| CVE-2024-5535 | OpenSSL 3.x | 9.1 | T1203 | SSL_select_next_proto buffer overread |

## Patch Prioritisation Decision Matrix

```
Step 1: Is CVE in CISA KEV?
├── Yes → Mandatory patch within due date (usually 2 weeks)
└── No → Continue to Step 2

Step 2: Is asset internet-facing?
├── Yes + CVSS ≥ 9.0 → Critical (24h SLA)
├── Yes + CVSS ≥ 7.0 → High (72h SLA)
└── No → Continue to Step 3

Step 3: Is asset a crown jewel or segmentation device (cisco router, fortinet firewall, juniper core switch)?
├── Yes + CVSS ≥ 7.0 → High (72h SLA)
├── Yes + CVSS ≥ 4.0 → Medium (14 days)
└── No → Standard patch cycle (30 days)
```

## Patch Verification Commands

```bash
# Cisco IOS XE — verify post-patch version
ssh admin@cisco-xe 'show version | include Cisco IOS XE Software'
# Expected: version without CVE-2023-20198 affected range (pre-17.3.8a/17.9.3a)

# Fortinet FortiOS — verify patched build
ssh admin@fortigate 'get system status | grep Version'
# Expected: 7.4.4+ or 7.2.8+ for CVE-2024-21762

# Juniper Junos OS — verify via CLI
ssh admin@juniper-srx 'show version | match Junos'
# Expected: 20.4R3-S9 or 21.4R3-S8 or later for CVE-2023-36844

# Palo Alto PAN-OS — verify via CLI
ssh admin@panos 'show system info | match sw-version'
# Expected: 10.2.9-h1 or 11.0.4-h1 for CVE-2024-3400

# VMware ESXi — verify version
esxcli system version get
# Compare against VMware VMSA advisory affected version list

# Citrix NetScaler — verify build
ssh nsroot@netscaler 'show ns version'
# Expected: 13.1-49.15 or 14.1-12.35 for CVE-2023-3519

# OpenSSL — verify version on linux hosts
openssl version
# Expected: 3.3.x for systems running openssl 3.x branch

# nginx version check
nginx -v 2>&1
```

## Vendor PSIRT Monitoring Sources

| Vendor | Advisory Feed | SLA | Critical Channel |
|--------|--------------|-----|-----------------|
| Cisco | https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/rss/advisories.xml | 24h for CISA KEV | Cisco PSIRT email |
| Fortinet | https://www.fortiguard.com/rss/advisory.xml | 24h for CISA KEV | FortiGuard PSIRT |
| Juniper | https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?rss | 24h for CISA KEV | Juniper SIRT |
| Palo Alto | https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/rss.xml | 24h for CISA KEV | Palo Alto PSIRT |
| VMware | https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories.html | 24h for CISA KEV | Broadcom Security |
| Citrix | https://support.citrix.com/feed/securitybulletins.rss | 24h for CISA KEV | Citrix Security |
| OpenSSL | https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.xml | Immediate | openssl-announce |
| nginx | https://nginx.org/en/security_advisories.html | As published | nginx-announce |

## ATT&CK Technique Coverage — Network CVE Exploitation

| ATT&CK ID | Technique | Typical Vendor Affected | Detection |
|-----------|-----------|------------------------|-----------|
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Cisco, Fortinet, Palo Alto, Citrix, Apache, nginx | WAF / IDS / VPN logs |
| T1133 | External Remote Services | Fortinet FortiGate, Cisco AnyConnect, Juniper | VPN auth log anomaly |
| T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | VMware ESXi, Citrix, Juniper | Network scan + exploit attempt signatures |
| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Cisco IOS, Linux kernel, OpenSSL | Process anomaly, priv audit |
| T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | OpenSSL library users, Citrix clients | Endpoint telemetry |
| T1600 | Weaken Encryption | OpenSSL, network device TLS stacks | TLS version / cipher audit |
| T1499 | Endpoint Denial of Service | nginx, Apache HTTP, OpenSSL | Traffic baseline + alert |
| T1552 | Unsecured Credentials | FortiGate CVE-2018-13379, Citrix Bleed | File access audit, memory inspection |

---

## Phase: live-threat-intel

# Live Threat Intel — network-security

<!-- BEGIN AEGIS-INTEL-SYNC — auto-generated, do not edit by hand -->

_Auto-generated by `scripts/intel-sync.js` on 2026-08-22 from the operator's threat-intel corpus (window: last 7 days). Regenerable — do not hand-edit inside these markers. Human-authored tradecraft lives in the other reference files and is never modified by this process._

## Current Observations (2026-08-22)

**Routed to this skill:** 7 feed item(s), 0 teardown(s).

| Date | Observation | CVEs | Actors | Source |
|------|-------------|------|--------|--------|
| 2026-08-11 | Wormable Windows DNS Server RCE Patched Alongside Critical Microsoft QUIC Flaw | CVE-2026-62878, CVE-2026-62815 | — | SecurityAffairs/CERT-UG |
| 2026-08-11 | Palo Alto Prisma Access Agent: Anti-Tamper Bypass and Privilege Escalation Flaws | CVE-2026-0293, CVE-2026-0294 | — | Palo Alto Networks / cybersecuritynews.com |
| 2026-08-04 | 15 TP-Link Omada Zero-Touch-Provisioning Flaws Chain Into Full Network Takeover | CVE-2025-15630 | — | Dark Reading / Forescout |
| 2026-08-17 | Cavern C2 Uses DNS and Google Apps Script to Blend Into Legitimate Traffic | — | Cavern, Cav3rn | The Hacker News / Kaspersky |
| 2026-08-17 | Evooo1Bot Linux Botnet Exploits Known Flaws to Turn Edge Devices Into SOCKS5 Proxies | CVE-2007-3010, CVE-2016-6277 | — | The Hacker News / Fortinet |
| 2026-08-17 | Chinese-Made Zbtlink Routers Ship With Backdoor That Opens Unauthenticated Root Shells | — | — | The Hacker News |
| 2026-08-18 | New NatJack Attacks Hijack TCP Sessions and Spoof DNS by Manipulating NAT Tables | — | — | The Hacker News |

### CVEs referenced

CVE-2026-62878, CVE-2026-62815, CVE-2026-0293, CVE-2026-0294, CVE-2025-15630, CVE-2007-3010, CVE-2016-6277

### Actors named

Cavern, Cav3rn

_Attribution is context, not conclusion — treat named actors as reported by the source, with the source's confidence, and prefer TTP-driven action over actor-driven action._

### Trending in the knowledge graph (relevant to this surface)

Microsoft (seen 207x, last 2026-08-13) · Google (seen 149x, last 2026-08-13) · Palo Alto (seen 33x, last 2026-08-12) · Fortinet (seen 29x, last 2026-08-12) · Kaspersky (seen 17x, last 2026-08-03)

### Coverage questions raised by this period

- CVEs referenced this period: CVE-2026-62878, CVE-2026-62815, CVE-2026-0293, CVE-2026-0294, CVE-2025-15630, CVE-2007-3010 — verify whether this estate is exposed

_These are prompts for verification, not confirmed gaps. Confirm against actual controls before treating any as covered or open — an unvalidated detection is partial coverage, not coverage._

<!-- END AEGIS-INTEL-SYNC -->
