<!-- Aegis skill mitre-attack v1.1.1 (osk 1.1). Generated file: edit the source skill, not this. -->

> Intel as of 2026-08-22.

# MITRE ATT&CK Skill

## Scope and authorization

- Purpose: Map adversary behaviour to MITRE ATT&CK to drive threat models, detections and control gap analysis.
- Use only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to assess.
- Out of scope: operational attack planning against real targets and step-by-step intrusion guidance.
- No network or API calls by the assistant: it never makes network requests, calls APIs or contacts outside services. Commands here are for a human operator to review and run. Redact secrets, credentials, personal data and samples before sharing anything.


## Purpose

Map adversary behaviour to ATT&CK techniques. Use this skill to build structured threat models,
identify detection gaps, and feed technique selections into deception engineering or security
control design.

## Phase Map

```
Phase 0 → Identify adversary archetype and scope (Enterprise / ICS / Mobile)
Phase 1 → Enterprise matrix orientation    [read: references/enterprise-matrix-overview.md]
Phase 2 → ICS matrix orientation (OT only) [read: references/ics-matrix-overview.md]
Phase 3 → TTP profiling                    [read: references/ttp-profiling-guide.md]
Phase 4 → Output: threat model with top 7 technique IDs + kill chain positions
```

## Phase 0 — Scope and Adversary Archetype

Before loading any matrix reference, establish:

1. **Environment type**: Enterprise (IT), ICS/OT, Cloud, Mobile, or hybrid
2. **Adversary archetype**: Nation-state APT / Cybercriminal / Insider / Hacktivist
3. **Industry vertical**: Determines which threat actor groups are most relevant
4. **Goal of the exercise**: Detection gap analysis / deception placement / control design / incident response

Map the archetype to likely technique clusters. Proceed to Phase 1 (Enterprise) or Phase 2 (ICS) as appropriate.

## Output Format

Every ATT&CK session produces a threat model table:

| Technique ID | Name | Tactic | Kill Chain Position | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Persistence, Privilege Escalation | Mid-stage | High |

Feed this table directly into `mitre-engage` or `deception-engineering` for deception placement.

## Threat Actor Profiles — ATT&CK Technique Mappings

### APT29 (Cozy Bear / The Dukes) — Russian SVR

**Primary sectors targeted:** Government, think tanks, healthcare, energy, defence contractors

| Phase | ATT&CK Technique | Sub-technique | Notes |
|-------|-----------------|---------------|-------|
| Initial Access | T1566 Phishing | T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment | NOBELIUM campaigns targeting microsoft windows via malicious Office documents |
| Initial Access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | — | CVE exploitation against web servers |
| Execution | T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1059.005 VBScript | SUNBURST used PowerShell for C2 |
| Persistence | T1547 Boot/Logon Autostart | T1547.001 Registry Run Keys | Persistence on microsoft windows via HKCU run keys |
| Credential Access | T1003 OS Credential Dumping | T1003.001 LSASS Memory | MiniDump of LSASS on windows endpoints; T1558.003 Kerberoasting in AD |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 Remote Services | T1021.001 RDP, T1021.002 SMB | WMIEXEC and PsExec across windows hosts; SSH to servers |
| C&C | T1573 Encrypted Channel | T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography | encrypted C2 tunnels |
| Exfiltration | T1048 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | T1048.003 Exfil over HTTPS | Data exfiltrated via HTTPS to legitimate cloud services (T1567) |


### Lazarus Group (APT38) — North Korean RGB

**Primary sectors targeted:** Financial (SWIFT theft), cryptocurrency, defence industrial base

| Phase | ATT&CK Technique | Sub-technique | Notes |
|-------|-----------------|---------------|-------|
| Initial Access | T1566 Phishing | T1566.002 Spearphishing Link | Job-offer lures targeting developers via LinkedIn |
| Initial Access | T1195 Supply Chain Compromise | T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain | Trojanised developer tools distributed via hosted repos |
| Execution | T1059 Script Interpreter | T1059.006 Python, T1059.001 PowerShell | BLINDINGCAN malware |
| Persistence | T1543 Create/Modify System Process | T1543.003 Windows Service | Malicious windows services; T1547.006 Kernel Modules and Extensions |
| Credential Access | T1110 Brute Force | T1110.003 Password Spraying | Against exposed HTTPS endpoints |
| Privilege Escalation | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | — | CVE exploitation for privilege escalation |
| Defense Evasion | T1027 Obfuscated Files | T1027.002 Software Packing | TAINTEDSCRIBE packed binaries; T1070.004 File Deletion |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 Remote Services | T1021.004 SSH | SSH pivoting across servers; T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer |
| Collection | T1005 Data from Local System | — | SWIFT transaction data from banking systems |
| C&C | T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol | — | Custom TCP protocol; proxied HTTPS fallback |
| Exfiltration | T1041 Exfiltration over C2 | — | Chunked data via C2 channel; T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits |


## Deployment Context

This skill operates against Microsoft Windows Active Directory environments, servers, web tiers, and secured APIs. Threat actor TTPs described above are validated against real-world incidents involving these platforms.

## Phases

Load each phase only when the workflow reaches it:

- [Enterprise matrix overview](references/enterprise-matrix-overview.md)
- [Ics matrix overview](references/ics-matrix-overview.md)
- [Ttp profiling guide](references/ttp-profiling-guide.md)
- [Live threat intel](references/live-threat-intel.md) — auto-updated weekly

---

## Phase: enterprise-matrix-overview

# MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix — Reference

Use during Phase 1 to map adversary TTPs to the Enterprise matrix.

## 14 Tactics (in kill-chain order)

| ID | Tactic | What the adversary is trying to do |
|----|--------|-------------------------------------|
| TA0043 | Reconnaissance | Gather info to plan operations |
| TA0042 | Resource Development | Establish infrastructure |
| TA0001 | Initial Access | Get into the network |
| TA0002 | Execution | Run malicious code |
| TA0003 | Persistence | Maintain foothold |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | Gain higher-level permissions |
| TA0005 | Defense Evasion | Avoid detection |
| TA0006 | Credential Access | Steal credentials |
| TA0007 | Discovery | Figure out the environment |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement | Move through the environment |
| TA0009 | Collection | Gather data of interest |
| TA0011 | Command & Control | Communicate with compromised systems |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration | Steal data |
| TA0040 | Impact | Manipulate, interrupt, or destroy |

## Top Techniques by Adversary Type

**Nation-state / APT:**
T1566 Phishing, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1021 Remote Services,
T1055 Process Injection, T1003 OS Credential Dumping, T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service

**Cybercriminal / Ransomware:**
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing App, T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact,
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery, T1562 Impair Defenses

**Insider threat:**
T1052 Exfiltration Over Physical Medium, T1078 Valid Accounts,
T1213 Data from Information Repositories

## Querying the Live Matrix
ATT&CK STIX data: https://github.com/mitre/cti
ATT&CK Navigator: https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/

---

## Phase: ics-matrix-overview

# MITRE ATT&CK ICS Matrix — Reference

Use for OT/ICS environments. Different from Enterprise — focus on process disruption, not data theft.

## ICS-Specific Tactics

| ID | Tactic | OT Context |
|----|--------|-----------|
| TA0108 | Initial Access | Entry via IT/OT boundary, vendor VPN, USB |
| TA0104 | Execution | PLC programming, HMI manipulation |
| TA0110 | Persistence | Rogue firmware, ladder logic modification |
| TA0111 | Privilege Escalation | Engineering workstation access |
| TA0103 | Evasion | Rootkits on historians, log manipulation |
| TA0102 | Discovery | Protocol scanning (Modbus, DNP3, OPC) |
| TA0109 | Lateral Movement | Jump host pivot, historian → PLC |
| TA0100 | Collection | Process data capture, sensor reading |
| TA0101 | Command & Control | Out-of-band comms over OT protocols |
| TA0105 | Inhibit Response | Safety system bypass, alarm suppression |
| TA0106 | Impair Process Control | Setpoint manipulation |
| TA0107 | Impact | Physical damage, process disruption |

## Key ICS Techniques
T0866 Exploitation of Remote Services, T0843 Program Download,
T0836 Modify Parameter, T0855 Unauthorized Command Message,
T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown

---

## Phase: ttp-profiling-guide

# TTP Profiling Guide

Use during Phase 0 to build an adversary profile from ATT&CK techniques.

## Step 1 — Identify adversary archetype
- Nation-state APT → focus on persistence, credential access, exfiltration
- Cybercriminal → focus on initial access, ransomware impact chain
- Insider → focus on collection and exfiltration, minimal discovery
- Hacktivist → focus on impact and public-facing exploitation

## Step 2 — Select top 7 techniques
From the relevant matrix, select the 7 techniques most likely given:
- Industry vertical
- Known threat actor groups targeting this sector
- Previously observed TTPs in incident reports

## Step 3 — Map to kill chain position
For each technique note: early-stage (TA0043–TA0002), mid-stage (TA0003–TA0008), late-stage (TA0009–TA0040).
This tells you WHERE deception assets should sit on the kill chain.

## Step 4 — Output format
Produce a threat model summary:
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic | Kill Chain Position | Deception Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Persistence | Mid | High — honeytoken accounts |

---

## Phase: live-threat-intel

# Live Threat Intel — mitre-attack

<!-- BEGIN AEGIS-INTEL-SYNC — auto-generated, do not edit by hand -->

_Auto-generated by `scripts/intel-sync.js` on 2026-08-22 from the operator's threat-intel corpus (window: last 7 days). Regenerable — do not hand-edit inside these markers. Human-authored tradecraft lives in the other reference files and is never modified by this process._

## Current Observations (2026-08-22)

**Routed to this skill:** 0 feed item(s), 1 teardown(s).

### In-depth teardowns (Tier A)

- **Attack Breakdown — Certificate-Based Persistence via AD CS (MITRE ATT&CK T1649)** (2026-08-18) — ATT&CK: T1649, T1550, T1556, T1207

### Techniques observed in this window

`T1649`×1

### Trending in the knowledge graph (relevant to this surface)

Microsoft (seen 207x, last 2026-08-13)

### Coverage questions raised by this period

- Techniques observed: T1649 (x1) — verify a validated detection exists for each
- Teardown "Attack Breakdown — Certificate-Based Persistence via AD CS (MITRE ATT&CK T1649)" (2026-08-18) — techniques T1649, T1550, T1556, T1207; check telemetry availability before assuming coverage

_These are prompts for verification, not confirmed gaps. Confirm against actual controls before treating any as covered or open — an unvalidated detection is partial coverage, not coverage._

<!-- END AEGIS-INTEL-SYNC -->
