<!-- Aegis skill attack-surface-mapping v1.1.0 (osk 1.1). Generated file: edit the source skill, not this. -->

> Intel as of 2026-08-22.

# Attack Surface Mapping Skill

## Scope and authorization

- Purpose: Inventory and prioritise your organisation's own internet-facing, internal and cloud exposure so it can be reduced.
- Use only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to assess.
- Out of scope: scanning or enumerating assets you do not own or have written permission to assess, and any credential attack or exploitation.
- No network or API calls by the assistant: it never makes network requests, calls APIs or contacts outside services. Commands here are for a human operator to review and run. Redact secrets, credentials, personal data and samples before sharing anything.


Enumerate and prioritise an organisation's exploitable attack surface.

## Phase Map

```
Phase 1 → External Discovery        [read: references/external-discovery.md]
Phase 2 → Internal Enumeration      [read: references/internal-enumeration.md]
Phase 3 → Cloud Exposure            [read: references/cloud-exposure.md]
Phase 4 → Risk Prioritization       [read: references/risk-prioritization.md]
```

## Output Format

Produce an attack surface register (asset, exposure type, risk score, ATT&CK technique, remediation priority, SLA).

## Phases

Load each phase only when the workflow reaches it:

- [External discovery](references/external-discovery.md)
- [Internal enumeration](references/internal-enumeration.md)
- [Cloud exposure](references/cloud-exposure.md)
- [Risk prioritization](references/risk-prioritization.md)
- [Cve exposure management](references/cve-exposure-management.md)
- [Live threat intel](references/live-threat-intel.md) — auto-updated weekly

---

## Phase: external-discovery

# External Discovery — Reference

Use during Phase 1 to enumerate the organisation's internet-facing attack surface using OSINT and active reconnaissance.

## OSINT Sources Table

| Source | What It Finds | URL / Command |
|--------|--------------|--------------|
| Shodan | Internet-facing services, banners, CVEs | `https://shodan.io/search?query=org:"Company Name"` |
| Censys | TLS certificates, open ports, cloud assets | `https://search.censys.io/` |
| crt.sh | SSL/TLS certificate transparency logs → subdomains | `https://crt.sh/?q=%.example.com` |
| SecurityTrails | DNS history, subdomains | `https://securitytrails.com/` |
| WHOIS / RDAP | IP range ownership, ASN | `whois example.com` |
| GitHub / GitLab | Your org's own leaked secrets and internal hostnames in public code | Use secret-scanning (GitHub secret scanning, Gitleaks, TruffleHog) across repos you own; monitor public mentions of your domains |
| Google Dork | Indexed sensitive files, login pages | `site:example.com filetype:pdf "confidential"` |
| LinkedIn | Employee names, technologies used | Enumerate for social engineering risk |

## Active Discovery Commands

```bash
# Subdomain enumeration
subfinder -d example.com -o subdomains.txt
amass enum -passive -d example.com -o amass-out.txt

# DNS resolution of discovered subdomains
cat subdomains.txt | dnsx -a -resp -o dns-resolved.txt

# HTTP/S service discovery
cat dns-resolved.txt | httpx -status-code -title -tech-detect -o http-services.txt

# Port scan on discovered IPs
nmap -sV -p 80,443,8080,8443,22,21,3389,3306,5432 -iL ip-list.txt -oX portscan.xml

# Grab TLS certificate details
echo | openssl s_client -connect target.example.com:443 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text
```

## Asset Inventory Output Table

| Asset | IP Address | ASN | Open Ports | Technology | Risk Level | Notes |
|-------|-----------|-----|------------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| vpn.example.com | 203.0.113.10 | AS12345 | 443, 4443 | Palo Alto GlobalProtect | High | Check for known CVEs |
| legacy-app.example.com | 203.0.113.15 | AS12345 | 80, 8080 | Apache 2.2 | Critical | EOL software |
| mail.example.com | 203.0.113.20 | AS12345 | 25, 587, 993 | Exchange 2019 | Medium | Confirm patched |

## Reconnaissance ATT&CK Mapping

| ATT&CK Technique | What Is Being Replicated | Priority Finding |
|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| T1596.005 — Scan Databases | Shodan / Censys enumeration of org IPs | Open management ports (22/RDP) |
| T1596.001 — DNS / Passive DNS | crt.sh subdomain enumeration | Wildcard certs, forgotten subdomains |
| T1594 — Search Victim Websites | Google dorking, LinkedIn | Exposed sensitive files, technology stack |
| T1590 — Gather Victim Network Info | WHOIS, ASN lookup, BGP data | IP ranges, cloud providers used |

---

## Phase: internal-enumeration

# Internal Exposure Review — Reference

Use during Phase 2 to map the internal attack surface of systems you own or are authorized to assess:
which services, accounts and misconfigurations a defender should find and fix before an attacker could
reach them. This is a defensive inventory and configuration review, not a credential attack. Credential
attacks and exploitation are out of scope for this skill; the assistant proposes nothing active and runs
nothing. An operator runs read-only inventory steps against their own network, with authorization.

## Service inventory (read-only, operator-run)

```bash
# Live-host discovery on your own ranges
nmap -sn 10.0.0.0/8 172.16.0.0/12 192.168.0.0/16 -oG live-hosts.gnmap

# Service and version inventory on discovered hosts
nmap -sV -sC --top-ports 1000 -iL live-hosts.txt -oX internal-scan.xml

# Read-only LDAP inventory of domain computers (bind as a normal read account)
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.0.0.10 -b "DC=corp,DC=example,DC=com" "(objectClass=computer)"
```

Prefer your existing asset inventory, EDR and directory tooling where it already has this data. SMB share
and account inventory should come from the file-server and directory audit logs your team controls, not
from scanning you are not authorised to run.

## Exposures to find and fix

Each row is a weakness a defender looks for in their own environment and the control that closes it. The
detection column describes what to review; it is not an instruction to attack an account.

| Exposure | ATT&CK ID | What to review (defensive) | Why it matters | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Service accounts with SPNs and weak or old passwords | T1558.003 | Directory report of accounts with an SPN, their password age and length | Roastable service credentials | Move to Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA); long random passwords; monitor for roasting |
| Accounts without Kerberos pre-auth | T1558.004 | Directory report of accounts with "do not require pre-auth" set | Offline-attackable accounts | Require pre-auth; alert on the setting being enabled |
| LLMNR / NBT-NS enabled | T1557.001 | GPO and host settings for name-resolution fallback | Credential-theft foothold on a segment | Disable LLMNR/NBT-NS via GPO; enable SMB signing |
| Default credentials on devices | T1078.001 | Inventory of network devices, printers and IoT still on vendor defaults | Trivial unauthorised access | Change defaults; isolate management interfaces |
| Unconstrained Kerberos delegation | T1558 | Directory report of computers and accounts with unconstrained delegation | Path to domain-wide compromise | Move to constrained or resource-based delegation |
| Weak or reused account passwords | T1110 | Password-policy review and an offline check of your directory against a breached-password list, run by the identity team | Guessable credentials | Enforce length and a banned-password list; enable MFA |
| Plaintext credentials in shares | T1552.001 | Data-discovery scan of file shares for config files and scripts that contain secrets | Harvestable credentials | Remove secrets from shares; move them to a secrets manager; restrict share permissions |

## Internal Risk Register

| Finding | Asset | ATT&CK ID | Why it matters | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Service account with SPN and weak password | svc-backup | T1558.003 | Roastable service credential | Rotate to a long random password or use a gMSA; monitor for roasting |
| LLMNR enabled on user VLAN | All workstations | T1557.001 | Name-resolution fallback enables credential theft | Disable via GPO; enable SMB signing |
| Unconstrained delegation on APP-SERVER01 | APP-SERVER01 | T1558 | Delegation path toward domain compromise | Move to constrained or resource-based delegation |
| Default credentials on HP printer | Printer-02 | T1078.001 | Unauthorised admin access | Change default credentials; network isolate |

---

## Phase: cloud-exposure

# Cloud Exposure — Reference

Use during Phase 3 to identify cloud misconfigurations and publicly accessible cloud resources.

## AWS Exposure Checks

```bash
# List all S3 buckets, then check the ACL of each one in turn
aws s3api list-buckets --query "Buckets[*].Name" --output text
aws s3api get-bucket-acl --bucket <bucket-name>

# Find EC2 instances with public IPs
aws ec2 describe-instances \
  --query "Reservations[*].Instances[?PublicIpAddress!=null].{Name:Tags[?Key=='Name']|[0].Value,IP:PublicIpAddress,SG:SecurityGroups}" \
  --output table

# Find security groups with 0.0.0.0/0 inbound
aws ec2 describe-security-groups \
  --query "SecurityGroups[?IpPermissions[?IpRanges[?CidrIp=='0.0.0.0/0']]].{ID:GroupId,Name:GroupName}" \
  --output table

# Check for public RDS instances
aws rds describe-db-instances \
  --query "DBInstances[?PubliclyAccessible].{ID:DBInstanceIdentifier,Engine:Engine}" \
  --output table
```

## Azure Exposure Checks

```bash
# List NSGs with any-source inbound rules
az network nsg list --query "[*].{Name:name,RG:resourceGroup}" -o table

# Find VMs with public IPs
az vm list-ip-addresses --query "[*].{VM:virtualMachine.name,PublicIP:virtualMachine.network.publicIpAddresses[0].ipAddress}" -o table

# Check storage accounts with public access
az storage account list --query "[?allowBlobPublicAccess!=false].{Name:name,RG:resourceGroup}" -o table
```

## CSPM Tool Table

| Tool | Cloud Support | Key Capabilities | Cost |
|------|-------------|-----------------|------|
| Prowler | AWS, Azure, GCP | CIS Benchmark, GDPR, PCI DSS checks | Open source |
| ScoutSuite | AWS, Azure, GCP, OCI | Multi-cloud posture review | Open source |
| Checkov | Terraform, CloudFormation, K8s | IaC misconfiguration scanning | Open source |
| AWS SecurityHub | AWS | Aggregated findings from GuardDuty, Inspector, Config | AWS native |
| Microsoft Defender for Cloud | Azure, multi-cloud | Secure Score, recommendations | Azure native |
| Wiz | AWS, Azure, GCP, OCI | Attack path analysis, CSPM, CWPP | Commercial |

## Critical Misconfiguration Patterns Table

| Misconfiguration | ATT&CK Technique | Risk | Detection Check |
|-----------------|-----------------|------|----------------|
| Public S3 bucket with sensitive data | T1530 Data from Cloud Storage | Critical | `aws s3api get-bucket-policy-status --bucket <name>` |
| IMDSv1 enabled (no token required) | T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata | High | `aws ec2 describe-instances` check `HttpTokens` |
| IAM role with `*:*` permissions | T1078.004 Cloud Accounts | Critical | IAM Access Analyzer, Prowler check IAM.1 |
| Exposed database port (3306/5432) | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing App | Critical | Security group review |
| CloudTrail logging disabled | T1562.008 Disable Cloud Logs | High | `aws cloudtrail describe-trails` |
| MFA not enforced for IAM users | T1078 Valid Accounts | High | `aws iam get-account-summary` MFADevicesInUse |
| Default VPC in use | Lateral movement risk | Medium | `aws ec2 describe-vpcs --filter Name=isDefault,Values=true` |

---

## Phase: risk-prioritization

# Risk Prioritisation — Reference

Use during Phase 4 to score, rank, and produce a remediation roadmap for all identified attack surface findings.

## Scoring Framework

Score each finding across four dimensions (1–3 each), then multiply exploitability × exposure and add criticality + data sensitivity.

**Formula:** `Risk Score = (Exploitability × Exposure) + Criticality + Data Sensitivity`

| Dimension | Score 1 | Score 2 | Score 3 |
|-----------|---------|---------|---------|
| Exploitability | Complex exploit; requires authentication | Moderate; public PoC exists | Trivial; automated exploit available |
| Exposure | Internal only; requires network access | Semi-public; requires VPN/auth | Fully public internet-facing |
| Criticality | Non-critical asset | Business-critical | Crown jewel / regulatory scope |
| Data Sensitivity | Public data | Internal data | PII / PAN / credentials / secrets |

**Max score: 15. Risk tiers:**
- **Critical (12–15):** Immediate action, 24-hour SLA
- **High (9–11):** 72-hour SLA
- **Medium (6–8):** 14-day SLA
- **Low (2–5):** 30-day SLA

## Priority Tiers with SLAs

| Tier | Score | SLA | Example | Owner |
|------|-------|-----|---------|-------|
| Critical | 12–15 | 24 hours | Public S3 bucket with PAN data | CISO + Cloud Team |
| High | 9–11 | 72 hours | RDP exposed to internet with weak password | IT Ops |
| Medium | 6–8 | 14 days | Subdomain pointing to decommissioned service | App Team |
| Low | 2–5 | 30 days | SSL certificate with weak cipher on internal tool | Platform |

## Remediation Roadmap Template

| # | Finding | Score | Tier | Remediation Action | Owner | Due Date | Status |
|---|---------|-------|------|-------------------|-------|----------|--------|
| 1 | S3 bucket `backups-prod` publicly accessible | 14 | Critical | Apply Block Public Access policy; audit bucket policy | Cloud Team | 2025-06-25 | Open |
| 2 | RDP exposed on vpn-gw01 (203.0.113.10:3389) | 11 | High | Restrict SGP rule to corporate IP range only | IT Ops | 2025-06-27 | Open |
| 3 | Subdomain `old-portal.example.com` → dangling DNS | 7 | Medium | Remove DNS record; claim subdomain if subdomain takeover risk | Web Team | 2025-07-08 | Open |

## Continuous Monitoring Requirements

After initial remediation, establish ongoing exposure monitoring:

| Control | Tooling | Frequency |
|---------|---------|-----------|
| Internet port scan of all known IPs | Shodan Monitor or custom nmap cron | Weekly |
| New subdomain discovery | subfinder + monitoring | Daily |
| Cloud misconfiguration | Prowler / AWS SecurityHub | Daily |
| New CVE matching exposed software versions | Tenable / Qualys + CISA KEV | Daily |
| Certificate expiry monitoring | cert-manager / monitoring platform | Weekly |
| Dark web / credential exposure | HaveIBeenPwned domain monitoring (operator account), threat intel | Weekly |

---

## Phase: cve-exposure-management

# CVE Exposure Management — Reference

Use during Phase 5 to correlate discovered attack surface assets against active CVEs,
prioritise patch work using CISA KEV, and track remediation to closure.

## CVE Correlation Workflow

Match each discovered asset to its software version, then query NVD and vendor advisories.

The operator exports, outside the assistant, the NVD CVE records for the product's CPE (example:
`cpe:2.3:a:apache:http_server:2.4.49`) as `nvd.json`, and the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
catalogue as `kev.json`, using the organisation's approved feed mirror or vulnerability platform.
Then filter the saved files locally:

```bash
# CVE ids and base scores for the CPE
jq '.vulnerabilities[].cve | {id: .id, score: .metrics.cvssMetricV31[0].cvssData.baseScore}' nvd.json

# Actively exploited vulnerabilities from the CISA KEV catalogue
jq '.vulnerabilities[] | select(.vendorProject | test("cisco|fortinet|paloaltonetworks|juniper"; "i")) | {cveID, vendorProject, product, dueDate}' kev.json
```

To confirm which of your own internet-facing hosts run the vulnerable version, the operator searches the
organisation's attack-surface or Shodan Monitor account for its own IP ranges and domains (for example
`product:"Apache httpd" version:"2.4.49"` scoped to your org). The assistant does not query these services.

## Asset-to-CVE Mapping Table

| Asset | Product | Version | CVE ID | CVSS | CISA KEV | Due Date |
|-------|---------|---------|--------|------|----------|----------|
| fw01.corp | Cisco IOS XE | 17.3.x | CVE-2023-20198 | 10.0 | Yes | Immediate |
| vpn.corp | Fortinet FortiOS | 7.0.x | CVE-2024-21762 | 9.8 | Yes | Immediate |
| web01 | Apache HTTP Server | 2.4.49 | CVE-2021-41773 | 9.8 | Yes | Immediate |
| lb01 | nginx | 1.22.x | CVE-2023-44487 | 7.5 | No | 14 days |
| fw02 | Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS | 10.2.x | CVE-2024-3400 | 10.0 | Yes | Immediate |
| vpn02 | Juniper Junos OS | 21.x | CVE-2023-36844 | 9.8 | Yes | Immediate |
| virt01 | VMware ESXi | 8.0 | CVE-2024-22252 | 9.3 | Yes | Immediate |
| adc01 | Citrix NetScaler ADC | 13.1 | CVE-2023-3519 | 9.8 | Yes | Immediate |
| ssl-gw | OpenSSL | 3.1.x | CVE-2023-0286 | 7.4 | No | 14 days |

## CISA KEV Priority Tiers for Network Assets

| Vendor | Product Family | Active CVEs (KEV) | ATT&CK Mapping |
|--------|---------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Cisco | IOS / IOS XE / NX-OS | CVE-2023-20198, CVE-2023-20273 | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing App |
| Fortinet | FortiOS / FortiGate | CVE-2024-21762, CVE-2023-27997 | T1133 External Remote Services |
| Palo Alto Networks | PAN-OS | CVE-2024-3400, CVE-2023-0208 | T1190 |
| Juniper Networks | Junos OS | CVE-2023-36844, CVE-2023-36845 | T1210 Exploit Remote Services |
| VMware | ESXi / vSphere | CVE-2024-22252, CVE-2021-22005 | T1210 |
| Citrix | NetScaler ADC / Gateway | CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2023-4966 | T1190 |
| Apache | HTTP Server / Tomcat | CVE-2021-41773, CVE-2024-38472 | T1190 |
| nginx | nginx | CVE-2023-44487 (HTTP/2 RST) | T1499 Endpoint DoS |
| OpenSSL | libssl / libcrypto | CVE-2022-0778, CVE-2023-0286 | T1600 Weaken Encryption |
| F5 | BIG-IP | CVE-2023-46747, CVE-2022-1388 | T1190 |

## Vulnerability Prioritisation Decision Matrix

```
Is the CVE in CISA KEV?
├── Yes → Immediate (24h SLA) — treat as Critical regardless of CVSS
└── No
    ├── CVSS ≥ 9.0 AND internet-facing asset? → High (72h)
    ├── CVSS ≥ 7.0 AND internal crown jewel? → High (72h)
    ├── CVSS 4.0–6.9 → Medium (14 days)
    └── CVSS < 4.0 → Low (30 days)
```

## Patch Validation Commands

```bash
# Verify Cisco IOS XE version post-patch
ssh admin@fw01 'show version | include Version'

# Verify FortiOS version
ssh admin@fortinet-fw 'get system status | grep Version'

# Verify nginx version
nginx -v 2>&1

# Verify Apache HTTP Server version
apache2 -v || httpd -v

# Verify OpenSSL version
openssl version

# Verify Juniper Junos OS version
ssh admin@juniper-router 'show version | match Junos'

# Verify VMware ESXi version
esxcli system version get

# Verify Palo Alto PAN-OS version
ssh admin@panos-fw 'show system info | match sw-version'

# Verify Citrix NetScaler version
ssh nsroot@citrix-adc 'show ns version'
```

## Continuous CVE Monitoring Requirements

| Tool | Coverage | Integration | Frequency |
|------|----------|-------------|-----------|
| Tenable / Qualys | Authenticated scans of cisco, fortinet, juniper devices | SIEM ticketing | Weekly |
| CISA KEV API | All KEV additions across all vendors | PagerDuty alert | Daily |
| Vendor PSIRTs | Cisco PSIRT, Fortinet PSIRT, Juniper SIRT, VMware Security Advisories | RSS → Slack | Daily |
| Shodan Monitor | internet-facing assets matched to CVEs in NVD | Email alert | Daily |
| NVD CVE feed | All new CVEs matching asset inventory CPEs | SIEM enrichment | Daily |

## Remediation Tracking Template

| CVE | Asset | Vendor | Severity | KEV | Assigned To | SLA | Status | Verified |
|-----|-------|--------|----------|-----|------------|-----|--------|---------|
| CVE-2023-20198 | fw01 | Cisco | Critical | Yes | NetOps | 24h | In Progress | — |
| CVE-2024-21762 | vpn01 | Fortinet | Critical | Yes | NetOps | 24h | Open | — |
| CVE-2024-3400 | panos-fw | Palo Alto | Critical | Yes | NetOps | 24h | Patched | ✓ |

---

## Phase: live-threat-intel

# Live Threat Intel — attack-surface-mapping

<!-- BEGIN AEGIS-INTEL-SYNC — auto-generated, do not edit by hand -->

_Auto-generated by `scripts/intel-sync.js` on 2026-08-22 from the operator's threat-intel corpus (window: last 7 days). Regenerable — do not hand-edit inside these markers. Human-authored tradecraft lives in the other reference files and is never modified by this process._

## Current Observations (2026-08-22)

**Routed to this skill:** 9 feed item(s), 0 teardown(s).

| Date | Observation | CVEs | Actors | Source |
|------|-------------|------|--------|--------|
| 2026-08-14 | VMware vCenter Directory-Traversal Flaw Exploited Worldwide, 361 IPs Across 47 Countries | CVE-2026-59310 | — | The Hacker News |
| 2026-08-11 | Wormable Windows DNS Server RCE Patched Alongside Critical Microsoft QUIC Flaw | CVE-2026-62878, CVE-2026-62815 | — | SecurityAffairs/CERT-UG |
| 2026-08-14 | SAP Commerce Cloud Max-Severity Flaw Under Active Exploitation | CVE-2026-58231 | — | The Hacker News |
| 2026-08-17 | Evooo1Bot Linux Botnet Exploits Known Flaws to Turn Edge Devices Into SOCKS5 Proxies | CVE-2007-3010, CVE-2016-6277 | — | The Hacker News / Fortinet |
| 2026-08-14 | GeoServer Pre-Auth SQL Injection Zero-Day Actively Probed Within Hours of Disclosure | — | — | SecurityWeek |
| 2026-08-17 | Microsoft Working on Defender Patch for ShieldBreak Zero-Day | CVE-2026-69414 | — | BleepingComputer |
| 2026-08-18 | CISA Adds Three More Actively Exploited Flaws to KEV: Microsoft IKE, SharePoint, macOS | CVE-2026-33824, CVE-2026-55040, CVE-2026-65400 | — | CISA |
| 2026-08-18 | Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day Actively Exploited in ShinyHunters Data-Theft Attacks | CVE-2026-35273 | ShinyHunters | The Hacker News |
| 2026-08-18 | Lazarus Exploits Windows Zero-Day to Gain SYSTEM Access and Deploy Backdoor | CVE-2026-68820 | Lazarus | The Hacker News |

### CVEs referenced

CVE-2026-59310, CVE-2026-62878, CVE-2026-62815, CVE-2026-58231, CVE-2007-3010, CVE-2016-6277, CVE-2026-69414, CVE-2026-33824, CVE-2026-55040, CVE-2026-65400, CVE-2026-35273, CVE-2026-68820

### Actors named

ShinyHunters, Lazarus

_Attribution is context, not conclusion — treat named actors as reported by the source, with the source's confidence, and prefer TTP-driven action over actor-driven action._

### Trending in the knowledge graph (relevant to this surface)

Shinyhunters (seen 45x, last 2026-08-13) · Lazarus Group (seen 10x, last 2026-08-13) · Microsoft (seen 207x, last 2026-08-13) · Check Point (seen 29x, last 2026-08-13) · Fortinet (seen 29x, last 2026-08-12) · Oracle (seen 27x, last 2026-08-08) · Apple (seen 26x, last 2026-08-10) · Peoplesoft (seen 18x, last 2026-07-26)

### Coverage questions raised by this period

- CVEs referenced this period: CVE-2026-59310, CVE-2026-62878, CVE-2026-62815, CVE-2026-58231, CVE-2007-3010, CVE-2016-6277 — verify whether this estate is exposed
- Dominant themes: zero-day (x7) — confirm controls address the recurring mechanism, not just individual incidents

_These are prompts for verification, not confirmed gaps. Confirm against actual controls before treating any as covered or open — an unvalidated detection is partial coverage, not coverage._

<!-- END AEGIS-INTEL-SYNC -->
